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Brexit, Indyref2 and the 2019
General Election in Scotland




1 The slim Conservative majority which Boris Johnson inherited from Theresa May after
she  resigned  from  office  in  July  2019  did  not  survive  long  under  the  new  Prime
Minister.  It  soon became apparent  that  his  first  few months  in  office  were  veered
towards a new general election and that his campaign had started the day he settled in
10 Downing Street. The only way to change the arithmetic in the House of Commons
was to force a new election and take a united stand on the Brexit issue in order to gain
a  majority  of  Conservative  MPs.  Theresa  May’s  downfall,  like  that  of  three  of  her
predecessors, had been caused by constant infighting over Europe in her party and she
had been unable to secure a majority for the agreement she struck with her European
counterparts. Boris Johnson’s brutal purge of Conservative Cabinet ministers and 21
Conservative MPs who had voted against him on Brexit were a sign that he expected his
troops to line behind him as he prepared for a new electoral battle. The objective was
to argue that his party was the only one able to break the impasse among politicians at
Westminster and “get Brexit  done” to move the country forward. The Conservative
campaign was therefore light on policy detail but relied instead on strict discipline and
a core Brexit message meant to woo Brexit supporters of all colours and specifically
court Labour leave voters of the North and Midlands. The demographics of the 2016
European referendum having shown that many Leave voters were to be found among
the  ranks  of  traditional  Labour  voters,  Johnson  and  his  advisers  wanted  to  strike
directly at Labour’s heartlands in the hope that Brexit would trump traditional party
allegiances. 
2 Their strategy eventually produced a commanding majority of 365 seats in the House of
Commons:  the  Conservatives  managed  to  win  seats  such  as  Bishop  Auckland  and
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Sedgefield, which had voted Labour for generations but had returned Leave majorities
in the 2016 European referendum. However, it was clear that a similar strategy was
never going to function in Scotland where 62% voted Remain in 2016. Neither could the
Conservatives  afford  to  ignore  Scotland  as  they  knew  too  well  that  they  had  only
managed to snatch victory out of the jaws of defeat in the 2017 general election thanks
to  the  crucial  addition  of  thirteen  Scottish  Conservative  seats.  The  upsurge  in
Conservative votes in Scotland under the leadership of Ruth Davidson coincided with a
strong unionist message which had proved fruitful in the 2017 general election despite
a  political  context  dominated  by  Brexit.  However,  the  Scottish  Conservatives’
charismatic and outspoken pro-Remain leader, Ruth Davidson, resigned in August 2019
and the party was led by a more lacklustre acting leader, Jackson Carlaw, as it entered
the  2019  general  election  campaign.  Could  the  Scottish  Conservatives  repeat  their
success of 2017 by focusing on the Union and betting that Scotland’s constitutional
debate would once again trump the issue of Brexit? This paper will seek to compare the
last two general election campaigns in Scotland in order to determine to what extent
Brexit determined the results of the 2019 general election. 
 
The 2019 general election results in Scotland:
swinging back to the SNP
3 The stark difference between the last two general elections is immediately noticeable
on Scotland’s electoral map: the 2019 general election marked a return of the SNP as
the Nationalists won 48 out of 59 seats, that is 13 seats more than in 2017, but still 8
seats behind their historic high of 2015. There was no “Nationalist tsunami” as in 2015
but the 2019 general election results nonetheless sent a strong message to the majority
party in Westminster as the SNP increased their share of the vote to 45%. Whether this
was the result of a protest vote over Brexit and Conservative policies or a full-hearted
swing to independence, Scottish voters were clearly voicing their opposition to Brexit
and  Boris  Johnson’s  government  by  endorsing  the  SNP’s  rejection  of  Brexit  and
demands  for  a  second  independence  referendum  in  a  majority  of  Scottish
constituencies. The higher turnout to the election would also indicate the heightened
perceived importance of the election compared to that of 2017 and suggests that more
voters may have considered voting to either express their concerns about or opposition
to  Brexit  and Boris  Johnson,  or  their  feelings  about  Scotland’s  constitutional  issue.
Indeed, while lower than the 2015 general election turnout (71.1%), the 2019 election
turnout was almost two points higher than in 2017 (increasing from 66.4% to 68.1%)
and almost one point higher than that of the UK as a whole (67.3%).
4 The two main unionist parties, Labour and the Conservatives, lost six and seven seats
respectively – falling to one single seat for the former and six for the latter – while the
Liberal  Democrats  managed  to  keep  four  seats  in  Scotland  with  the  loss  of
Dumbartonshire  East  compensated by the gain of  North East  Fife.  Although Labour
managed to cling on to the seat of Edinburgh South which it had already won in 2015,
the party’s share of the vote was at a historic low of 18.6%, that is 8.5 points below its
2017 score. The Labour party garnered more support in Central Belt constituencies,
especially in and around Glasgow where it often came second after the SNP, but fared
very  poorly  in  the  Borders  region,  North  East  as  well  as  Highlands  and  Islands
constituencies. The Conservative performance, albeit better than it was for decades in
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Scotland, was disappointing to the party. Although their share of the vote only dropped
by 3.5 points (to 25.1%), they were unable to keep more than half of their seats. The loss
of their extremely popular pro-Remain leader, Ruth Davidson, in August 2019 and her
replacement by a more lacklustre acting leader, Jackson Carlaw, dented their chances
of making the most of their strong unionist message. 
5 The unpopularity of Prime Minister Boris Johnson north of the border may also have
hurt the Conservative vote: a series of Panelbase polls in November and December 2019
found that 59% of respondents in Scotland thought he was doing a bad or very bad job
as Prime Minister compared to 44% overall in the UK. Similarly, Labour would have also
appeared to suffer from the lack of popularity of its UK leader: while 21% of Labour
voters in Scotland said they backed the Labour party because it had the best leader,
only 3% of them did so in 2019. More Labour voters (33%) cited the party’s policies as
being decisive of their choice in 2019 than in 2017 (26%), thus implying that they voted
for Labour despite its leader rather than because of him.1 In contrast, Nicola Sturgeon’s
popularity undoubtedly served as an asset to the Nationalists, with 51% of respondents
saying that she was doing very well or fairly well as First Minister in a YouGov poll of
December 2019 (up from 49% in April 2017).
6 Nevertheless, while all seven of the lost Conservative seats were won by the SNP, the
Conservatives’ losses in terms of vote share in these seats were rather low, oscillating
between 2.8% in Ochill & South Perthshire, 3.5% in Stirling, 4.9% in East Renfrewshire
and 6.2% in Aberdeen South for instance. The Conservatives’ share of the vote even
increased by 0.5% in Gordon despite their  loss of  that particular constituency.  This
would suggest that the Scottish Conservatives did not lose their core support despite
the unpopularity of their UK leader, the loss of Ruth Davidson as Scottish leader and
her replacement by Jackson Carlaw. 
7 The common denominator to all these swing constituencies appears to be a substantial
increase  of  the  Nationalists’  share  of  the  vote.  In  Gordon,  for  instance,  the  SNP
increased its share of the vote by 6.9% and appears to have benefited from the losses
suffered by Labour (-6.4%) and the Liberal Democrats (-1%). In Stirling, the SNP won
14.4% of votes as Labour lost 14%. Similarly, in the constituency of East Renfrewshire,
the  SNP  gained  13.7%  more  votes  than  in  2017,  while  Labour  lost  14.3%  and  the
Conservatives 4.9%. In Ochill & South Perthshire, the SNP won an extra 11.2% of votes
while Labour lost 11.4% and the Conservatives 2.8%. This suggests that the SNP was the
main recipient for Labour votes and that many Labour voters decided to switch their
vote to the SNP to send a message. 
 
The unionist campaigns
8 As in the rest of the UK, it would appear that the Scottish Labour Party suffered from
Jeremy Corbyn’s choice of a neutral stance over Brexit.  Although the Labour leader
reluctantly allowed his Scottish counterpart, Richard Leonard, to campaign for remain,
most voters would have been aware of Jeremy Corbyn’s Euroscepticism and plans to
broker a fresh Brexit deal with the EU before putting it to a referendum if a Labour
government  was  elected.  The  Scottish  Labour  Party’s  commitment  to  a  pro-remain
stance  in  its  electoral  manifesto  may  therefore  have  been  interpreted  as  a  hollow
promise  and  contributed  to  the  apparent  confusion  and  lack  of  decisiveness
demonstrated by the mixed messages and contradictory statements which plagued its
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campaign.  Scottish  Labour  understandably  attempted to  distance  itself  from its  UK
counterpart in order to better adapt to the pro-European Scottish landscape. Although
the party had managed to increase its share of the vote by 2.8% and win six extra seats
in the 2017 general election, it was aware that its humiliating defeat in the European
parliament elections of May 2019 was due to its leadership’s ambiguous position over
Brexit. The party’s share of the vote dropped to 9.3% in May 2019 and Labour failed to
return an MEP from Scotland for the first time in its history, while the SNP won 3 seats
and the Liberal Democrats a further seat on a firm pro-remain stance. 
9 Like its UK counterpart, Scottish Labour attempted to reverse that slump by focusing
its campaign on a wide range of generous social policies and spending commitments,
unveiling a multi-billion pound pledge to offer all school pupils free meals throughout
the year,  as well  as promising to a £2bn new low-carbon Scotland-wide bus fleet,  a
£70bn infrastructure fund and an extra £6bn on improving the country’s housing stock.
Many of its pledges, however, related to issues, such as education or health, which are
devolved to the Scottish Parliament. This meant that Labour would either have had to
win the support of the Scottish government or win the next Holyrood election in 2021
before it could effectively introduce these policies. Furthermore, if further proof were
needed of Scottish Labour’s difficulties to prove its Scottish credentials and emancipate
itself  from the UK Labour party,  the Scottish manifesto included several  significant
concessions  to  the  UK  party  on  both  the  renewal of  the  Trident  nuclear  weapons
system, which a vast majority of Scots are opposed to, and the timing of a Scottish
independence referendum. 
10 The latter proved to be a thorn in the Scottish leader’s side as the Scottish Labour’s
party  policy  on the  issue  so  far  has  been to  firmly  oppose  a  second independence
referendum and to prove its credentials as a strong defender of the Union. In doing so,
it vies to fight with the Conservatives over the unionist majority of Scottish voters but
has suffered from the mixed signals that some of its senior figures have sent over the
years. Former Scottish leader Kezia Dugdale, for instance, admitted that it wouldn’t be
“inconceivable” for her to argue against the UK Union in an interview with the Fabian
Review of  April  2016.  Although she  retracted her  statement  immediately,  she  then
claimed in July of the same year that it  would be “categorically wrong” for the UK
government to block a second independence referendum if it were called for by the
Scottish people2. 
11 Richard Leonard was in turn embarrassed by the Shadow Chancellor, John McDonnell,
in August 2019, after the latter declared that the party accepted a Labour government
could  not  block  a  Scottish  government  request  for  the  powers  to  hold  a  fresh
independence vote. Jeremy Corbyn himself made several contradictory statements over
a second independence referendum during the 2019 campaign, initially denying the
possibility  of  holding  a  second  referendum  for the  entire  five  years  of  the  next
parliament before saying that this position may change if the SNP won the May 2021
Scottish  Parliament  election  and  finally  declaring  that  there  would  be  no  second
referendum in the early years of a Labour Government3. This provided Boris Johnson
with an opportunity to argue that a Corbyn government would be dependent on SNP
support and that the country was facing a Corbyn-Sturgeon “alliance” that planned to
hold two referendums: one on Brexit and the other on Scottish independence. This was
in fact a rehash of an argument David Cameron used successfully in 2015 as he warned
of a  Miliband-Salmond alliance.  The argument reflected an assumption that  Labour
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could  not  win  an  outright  majority  and  appealed  to  latent  anti-Scottish  sentiment
among English voters uncomfortable at the idea of Scotland having an undue influence
on UK policy4. 
12 These  missteps  also  played  into  the  hands  of  the  Scottish  Conservative  campaign
which,  as  in  2016  and  2017,  focused  on  the  constitutional  issue.  The  Scottish
Conservatives had been provided evidence that they should run their campaigns as a
“Unionist” party rather than attempt to run on bread and butter issues as early as
October  2015,  when  a  Populus  data-analyst,  James  Kanagasooriam,  presented  his
findings on a pattern that allowed him to devise two new measures to describe and
analyse mathematically how people voted.  These measures were broadly defined as
‘security’ – a concept including levels of affluence, education and employment – and
‘diversity’ – including politics of identity and measurements of how urban an area is.
According  to  these  two  measures,  he  discovered  a  latent  line  which  separated
wealthier,  more secure and less  diverse Conservative voters from less  affluent,  less
secure but more diverse and urban Labour supporters. All voters and places on or close
to  the  line  were  to  be  considered  as  floating  voters  or  marginal  constituencies.
Crucially,  Kanagasooriam’s  analysis  of  the  results  of  the  2014  independence
referendum showed that ‘temperamentally Conservative voters’ overlapped with large
numbers of No voters who backed the Union while Labour and the SNP were in a turf
war  for  the  same  voters  due  to  a  demographic  overlap5.  In  contrast  to  Labour’s
ambiguous  and  conflicting  signals  on  Scotland’s  constitutional  issue,  the  former
Scottish  Conservative  leader,  Ruth  Davidson,  therefore  presented  a  clear  unionist
platform which fully acknowledged the new divide in Scottish politics in the aftermath
of the referendum. The 2017 general election marked a resurgence of the Conservative
party in Scotland as it unexpectedly increased its share of the vote by 13.7% and gained
12 seats, all of which from the SNP and in constituencies which had voted Remain. This
was evidence that the strategy worked and that it should be pursued further.
13 While  they  endorsed  their  leader’s  position  over  Brexit,  the  Scottish  Conservatives
therefore chose to run their 2019 campaign entirely based on their opposition to a
second independence referendum and issued an electoral manifesto aptly entitled “No
to  Indyref2”.  Their  main  pledge  was  to  “stop  Nicola  Sturgeon’s  plan  for  a  second
independence referendum next  year”,  thereby attempting to  thwart  the SNP’s  own
campaign,  centred  on  a  demand  for  a  second  independence  referendum.  The
Conservatives’ firm opposition to a second referendum became the leitmotiv of their
campaign and, in this sense, served as a perfect negative of the SNP campaign. While
the Conservative campaign attacked the idea of a second independence referendum
and backed Brexit, the SNP campaign strongly opposed Brexit and advocated a second
independence referendum. 
14 This adversarial, polarised battle left little breathing space for Labour and the Liberal-
Democrats who, caught in the middle, struggled to advance their policy agendas and
more nuanced constitutional positions. Both parties supported a federal position on the
constitution in the 2019 campaign but, with the Scottish electorate split in the middle
over independence, they have little chance of advancing their electoral prospects so
long as the constitutional issue remains prevalent in the Scottish political debate. In
many respects,  the last two general election campaigns in Scotland have illustrated
James Mitchell’s idea that “Scottish electoral politics is often defined by what parties
oppose”6.  The  constitutional  issue  has  been an unambiguous  asset  in  a  multi-party
Brexit, Indyref2 and the 2019 General Election in Scotland
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXV-3 | 2020
5
system for both the SNP and the Conservatives since the independence referendum of
2014.  While  the  SNP  has  no  competitor  for  the  independence  vote  –  the  pro-
independence Scottish Green party remaining a fringe party able to pick up enough
regional  votes  to  give  it  seats  in  the  Scottish  Parliament  but  not  enough  to  win
constituencies under the first-past-the-post system –, the Conservatives were provided
the opportunity to outbid Labour and the Liberal Democrats as the party most hostile
to the SNP and independence. 
15 Crucially, the constitutional issue in Scotland also allowed the Scottish Tories to avoid
having to defend their government’s record at Westminster by deflating attention paid
to  cuts  in  public  services  and  the  impact  of  austerity  policies  under  Conservative
governments  but  brandishing  instead  the  threat  of  an  economically  depressed
independent Scotland. Similar to that of the other UK parties, many of the pledges in
the 2019 general election manifesto issued by the Scottish Conservatives related in fact
to devolved issues. One of the oddities of general elections in Scotland is indeed that
much of the political debate preceding the election and the contents of the manifestos
issued by the parties are of little concern to Scotland as they fall under the remit of the
Scottish Parliament. Many of the controversies raised during the 2019 campaign that
were  related  to  health  issues,  the  construction  of  new  hospitals,  private  schools,
household bills and housing were in fact devolved issues and did not directly concern
the  Scottish  electorate.  To  introduce  the  policies  contained in  their  manifesto,  the
Scottish Conservatives would have to win the support of the SNP government – which
would appear unlikely – or win the next Holyrood election – which is as unlikely. This
shields the party from defending its more controversial manifesto pledges as it  can
always argue that they do not concern Scotland and deflates attention from the detail
of its proposed manifesto policies, enabling it to concentrate instead on its defence of
the Union.
16 The Tories also now benefit from the belief in some parts of Scotland that the SNP
under Sturgeon has become more of  a  “central  belt  party”.  Their  focus during the
campaign therefore turned to many of the north-east constituencies which they prised
from the SNP in 2017 and which coincidentally contain more pro-Brexit voters than
other constituencies in Scotland. Parts of the 2019 Scottish Conservative manifesto was
thus  veered  towards  those  communities,  whose  livelihoods  are  often  linked  to  the
fishing, oil and gas sectors. One of the pledges of the Scottish Conservative manifesto
for instance was to bring an oil and gas sector deal to support the North East economy
and protect the 100,000 jobs in Scotland that rely on oil and gas. Similarly, the Scottish
Conservative manifesto pledged to take back control of the UK’s fisheries by becoming
an independent coastal state, maintain funding for fisheries throughout the Parliament
and support regeneration of coastal communities and introduce a legal commitment to
fish sustainably.  These fishing communities,  to whom the Conservatives promised a
“sea of opportunity”, have overall tended to vote Leave in higher numbers and were
thus also more likely to favour the only major party in Scotland claiming to represent
the  Leave  minority.  The  Tories  were  able  to  combine  a  strong  anti-independence
message while harnessing the minority Leave vote. Unsurprisingly, they fared well in
the  north-eastern  constituencies  of  Banff  and  Buchan  (deemed  to  be  the  only
constituency that voted Leave in Scotland with 54% of the vote), Moray (which held
49.9%  Leavers  to  50.1%  Remainers),  and  Aberdeenshire  West  &  Kincardine  (61.5%
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Remainers  to  38.5% Leavers)  where they held on to  their  seats.  They came a  close
second to the SNP in Gordon and, to a lesser degree, in Angus and Aberdeen South.
 
The SNP, Brexit and Indyref2
17 The results of the European referendum of 2016 gave the SNP a chance to reboot their
independence campaign by claiming that the circumstances of the 2014 independence
referendum had changed and that Scots should be given a new opportunity to choose
their  constitutional  future.  The  SNP’s  2016  Scottish  Parliament  election  manifesto
provided for the eventuality of a second independence referendum after a Brexit vote
as it stated that a new referendum would be held only “if  there is clear and sustained
evidence that independence has become the preferred option of a majority of the Scottish people
– or if there is a significant and material change in the circumstances that prevailed in 2014,
such as Scotland being taken out of the EU against our will” . The discrepancy between the
results  of  the EU referendum in Scotland (with 62% voting Remain and 38% voting
Leave)  and  in  the  rest  of  Britain  did  correspond  to  the  change  of  circumstances
foreseen by the 2016 manifesto upon which the current SNP government was elected.
However, there was little appetite for a second referendum in 2017 and the surge in
support  for  independence  which  the  Nationalists  expected  after  the  European
referendum failed to materialise. The SNP lost 21 seats in 2017 and 13.1% of the vote
with some safe seats such as those of former leader Alex Salmond or Deputy leader
Angus Robertson falling to the hands of the Scottish Conservatives. Interpreting the
results  as  a  clear  sign  that  the  Scottish  electorate  rejected  her  plans  for  a  second
independence referendum, Scotland’s First Minister Nicola Sturgeon backtracked on
her promises and temporarily shelved her plans for a second referendum. 
18 However, the rise in support for independence witnessed by several opinion polls since
the spring of 2019, encouraged the SNP to campaign on an independence referendum
platform once again in December 2019.  Indeed,  several  polls  consistently registered
higher levels of support for independence, putting the percentage of people in favour
of independence at an average of 49% and making it a much more likely scenario. On
average, the five polls published during the 2019 campaign appeared to confirm this
trend  and  put  support  for  independence  at  48%,  that  is  1  point  below  the  polls
published previously but still 4 points more than the results of the 2014 referendum.
This trend was confirmed by the three polls published for Brexit Day on 31st January
(YouGov, Survation and Panelbase) which put support for independence at an average
of 51%. Polls later published in the spring of 2020 recorded a slight fall back to 49% but
confirmed that support for independence remained higher than it had before.
19 Furthermore, the increase of support for independence in the 2019 polls appeared to
have occurred primarily among Remain voters: a 55% support for independence among
Remain voters was 5 points higher than it was the previous year. Meanwhile, support
for independence among Leave voters dropped from 34% to 30%. The Brexit Day polls
further confirmed these trends, reporting an increase of support for independence of
an average 2 points with Remain voters and an average drop of 1.5 points with Leave
voters.7 This suggested that the Conservative governments’ chaotic handling of Brexit
eroded support for the Union among Remain voters and that the SNP could potentially
tap into the majority of Remain voters in Scotland to support them in December 2019.
This, of course, was to the advantage of the Nationalists who could rely on a pool of
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voters twice as large as that of Leave voters which the Scottish Conservatives were
vying to attract. While Labour is the main recipient of the Remain vote south of the
border, this position is held by the SNP in Scotland.
20 Besides, detailed analysis of YouGov’s Brexit Day poll shows that while hardly anyone
who voted No and Leave have changed their minds about independence, one in five
(21%) of those who voted No in 2014 and Remain in 2016 now say they would vote Yes,
and as many as three in ten (30%) who voted Yes and Leave now say they would vote
No8. These trends therefore represented a great advantage to the Nationalists in the
2019 general election. Their potential repercussions on Scottish political parties will be
great if confirmed as they could ensure the continuing hegemony of the SNP as the sole
major party campaigning on a pro-independence pro-European platform. Indeed, given
the way Brexit has affected support for independence, the three main unionist parties
in Scotland now appear to be fighting over a much more limited pool of voters: the
number of people who voted Yes and Leave (11%) is much lower than the number of
people who voted No and Remain (29%).
21 If anything, the 2019 general election results suggest that the future prospects of the
SNP  in  the  2021  Scottish  Parliament  elections  appear  all  the  brighter  as  the  link
between party support and Brexit vote has strengthened between 2017 and 2019. While
the Scottish Conservatives consolidated their support among Leave voters (+1%), they
lost 6% of votes among Remain voters. On the other hand, the results of the British
Election Panel Study show an increase in support for the SNP among both Remain (+9%)
and Leave voters (+3%) in 2019 compared to 2017. Findings from the study nevertheless
suggest the SNP also benefited from a greater increase in support among voters who
had voted No to independence in 2014 (+10%) than among voters who had voted Yes
(+4%), thereby indicating that No voters decided to switch their support to the SNP
despite its independence stance and because of its clear position over EU membership.
The Scottish Conservatives in turn lost 8% of their support among No voters. Indeed,
Brexit, rather than support for independence, appears to have been key to the SNP’s
success in the 2019 general election. 
2016 EU Referendum vote 2017  2019  2019-2017  
 Remain Leave Remain Leave Remain Leave
Conservative 18% 49% 12% 50% -6 +1
Labour 29% 22% 21% 14% -8 -8
Lib Dem 9% 4% 13% 5% +4 +1
SNP 43% 24% 52% 27% +9 +3
2014 Independence referendum vote Yes No Yes No Yes No
Conservative 9% 47% 9% 39% 0 -8
Labour 17% 34% 11% 25% -6 -9
Lib Dem 2% 10% 3% 15% +1 +5
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SNP 72% 9% 76% 19% +4 +10
22 Source: Results compiled after 2015-2019 British Election Panel Study, waves 13 and 19
 
Conclusion
23 Speaking ahead of  an  independence  rally  in  George  Square  on 2nd November  2019,
Nicola Sturgeon declared “This election is Scotland’s chance to escape Brexit and to put
our future into our own hands”,  thus setting the tone for the SNP’s campaign. She
described  her  party  as  “Scotland’s  Remain  party”  and  denounced  both  the
Conservatives’ “Brexit obsession” and Labour’s “woeful lack of leadership”. Having won
48  seats  in  Parliament  and  interpreting  her  majority  as  a  renewed  mandate,  First
Minister  Nicola  Sturgeon  wrote  to  Boris  Johnson  on  19th December  to  request  the
powers to legally stage another referendum under section 30 of the 1998 Scotland Act.
She further called for the Scottish Parliament to be granted permanent powers to hold
subsequent referendums on independence from the UK in a 38-page document entitled
“Scotland’s Right to Choose”. The negative answer she received on 14th January 2020
had been anticipated by the First Minister, who would undoubtedly prefer support for
independence to continue rising well above the 50% threshold needed for Scotland to
obtain its independence. The Nationalists will vie for a majority in the 2021 Scottish
Parliament election as a platform towards a second independence referendum and the
UK  government’s  management  of  Brexit  and  the  coronavirus  pandemic  may  shift
opinions further. If the 2017 general election results suggested that Scots were in no
mood for  a  second independence referendum, the 2019 general  election has shown
substantial changes in attitudes to independence and Brexit. A May 2020 Ipsos Mori
poll  for BBC Scotland found majority support for a second referendum with 63% of
respondents saying they now wanted another independence referendum within the
next  five  years.  If  anything,  the  results  of  the  2019  general  election  in  Scotland
therefore served as a stark reminder of the strains that leaving the European Union is
putting on the future of the UK Union. 
24 Fiona Simpkins is a Senior Lecturer in Contemporary British History, Politics and
Society at the University Lumière of Lyon, France. Her main areas of research are
devolution,  Scottish  politics, nationalism  and  the  constitutional  debate  in
Scotland. She  has  published  her  research  in  a  variety  of  books  and  journals,
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ABSTRACTS
While “ getting Brexit done” featured at the heart of the UK Conservative 2019 general election
campaign, it was clear that a similar strategy was never going to function in Scotland where 62%
voted Remain in 2016. Neither could the Conservatives afford to ignore Scotland as they knew too
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well that they had only managed to snatch victory out of the jaws of defeat in the 2017 general
election thanks to the crucial addition of thirteen Scottish Conservative seats. The upsurge in
Conservative  votes  in  Scotland  coincided  with  a  strong  unionist  message  which  had  proved
fruitful in the 2017 general election despite a political context dominated by Brexit. Could the
Scottish Conservatives repeat their success of 2017 by focusing on the Union and betting that
Scotland’s constitutional debate would once again trump the issue of Brexit? This paper will seek
to compare the last two general election campaigns in Scotland in order to determine to what
extent Brexit determined the results of the 2019 general election. 
Si mettre en œuvre le Brexit était au cœur de la campagne des conservateurs lors des élections
législatives britanniques de 2019, il apparaissait clairement que cette stratégie ne fonctionnerait
pas en Ecosse où 62% de l’électorat s’était prononcé en faveur du maintien du Royaume-Uni au
sein  de  l’Union Européenne en 2016.  Les  conservateurs  ne  pouvaient  non plus  se  permettre
d’ignorer l’Ecosse dont les treize sièges conservateurs écossais leur avait permis de justesse de se
maintenir à la tête du gouvernement britannique à la suite des élections législatives de 2017. La
résurgence du vote conservateur en Ecosse tenait à une forte campagne unioniste qui avait porté
ses  fruits  en  2017  malgré  un  contexte  politique  dominé  par  le  Brexit.  Les  conservateurs
pourraient-ils de nouveau l’emporter en focalisant leur campagne sur l’Union britannique et en
pariant que la question constitutionnelle écossaise éclipserait celle du Brexit ? Cet article propose
de comparer les deux dernières campagnes législatives britanniques en Ecosse afin de déterminer
l’influence du Brexit sur les résultats des élections de décembre 2019. 
INDEX
Mots-clés: Brexit, élections législatives britanniques 2019, référendum sur l’indépendance de
l’Ecosse, SNP, Parti conservateur écossais, Parti travailliste écossais
Keywords: Brexit, general election 2019, Scottish independence referendum, SNP, Scottish
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